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healthcare
Abstract
In the present allocation of resources in healthcare, preferences of consumers as the ultimate financiers
of healthcare services are judged to be of little relevance. This state of affairs is being challenged
because the past decade has seen great progress in the measurement of preferences, or more precisely,
willingness-to-pay (WTP) as applied to healthcare services. This article reports evidence on WTP of the
Swiss population with regard to three hypothetical modifications of the drug benefit to be covered by
social health insurance: delaying access to the most recent therapeutic innovations (among them, drugs)
by two years in exchange for a reduction of the monthly premium; substituting original preparations by
generics, again in return for a lowered premium; and the exclusion of preparations for the treatment of
minor complaints from the drug benefit. Using discrete-choice experiments, WTP and its determinants
are estimated. Average WTP for avoiding such a delay (which acts across the board) is much higher
than for eschewing the exclusive use of generics (which are claimed to be largely equivalent to the
original) or the retention of 'unimportant' drugs in the list of benefits - a rating predicted by economic
theory. In addition, a great deal of preference heterogeneity between the French-speaking minority and
the German-speaking majority was found, pointing to considerable efficiency losses caused by
uniformity of social health insurance.
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In the allocation of resources in health care, preferences of consumers as the ultimate 
financiers of healthcare services and pharmaceuticals in particular are of little relevance. This 
state of affairs is being challenged because the past decade has seen great progress in the 
measurement of preferences, or more precisely, willingness-to-pay (WTP) as applied to 
healthcare services. 
This contribution purports to report evidence on WTP of the Swiss population with regard to 
three hypothetical modifications of the drug benefit to be covered by social health insurance. 
One change is delaying access to the most recent therapeutic innovations (among them, drugs) 
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by two years in exchange for a reduction of the monthly premium. The second is substituting 
original preparations by generics, again in return for a lowered premium. The third 
modification is the exclusion of preparations for the treatment of minor complaints from the 
drug benefit. Using discrete-choice experiments, WTP and its determinants are estimated. 
Average WTP for avoiding such a delay (which acts across the board) is much higher than for 
eschewing the exclusive use of generics (which are claimed to be largely equivalent to the 
original) or the retention of "unimportant" drugs in the list of benefits – a rating predicted by 
economic theory. In addition, a great deal of preference heterogeneity between the French-
speaking minority and the German-speaking majority was found, pointing to considerable 
efficiency losses caused by uniformity of social health insurance. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
More stringent regulation of the use of healthcare services constitutes an attempt to contain 
public healthcare expenditure (HCE). However, such restrictions usually go along with a loss 
of expected utility for the individual, whose freedom of choice is restrained in the event of 
illness. For a regulation to be potentially welfare enhancing, cost savings accruing to 
individuals have to be higher than utility losses. These losses differ if preferences are 
heterogeneous, therefore uniform regulation of healthcare services may be inefficient, causing 
welfare losses to society as a whole. However, health policy makers almost never perform 
such cost-benefit comparisons. Their public focus is on cost, implying that a reduction of 
HCE is beneficial per se. By way of contrast, individuals presumably weigh the concomitant 
tax relief (in the case of a National Health Service) or premium reduction (in the case of an 
insurance-based system) against their loss of expected utility. This argument prompts a very 
simple research question, viz. what is the amount of compensation necessary to overcome 
consumer resistance against more stringent regulation of health care?  
 3
The objective of this paper is to present evidence on the likely magnitude of compensation 
required in an insurance-based country whose citizens are accustomed to a great deal of 
choice in health care, similar to the United States. It reports on experiments involving the 
Swiss resident population that are designed to measure (in money terms) the loss of expected 
utility caused by potential restrictions of the drug benefit. The tool used is discrete-choice 
experiments (DCE), a novel approach to preference and willingness-to-pay measurement that 
is rapidly gaining acceptance. There are three main findings of this study. (1) A delayed 
access to innovative treatments and drugs requires as much as one-fifth of the present average 
insurance premium to be voluntarily accepted; (2) Restricting the drug benefit to generics (if 
available) or excluding drugs for minor illnesses need not be compensated at all on average; 
(3) There is strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, suggesting that uniform regulation 
of the provision of health care may impose a substantial efficiency loss on the population of 
even a small country such as Switzerland with its 7.2 mn. inhabitants. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the second section, DCE are introduced as a tool for 
preference measurement. The third section informs about the design of the present 
experiment. The attributes of health care provision that are relevant to consumers must be 
identified and levels found that while not deemed unrealistic induce respondents to switch 
between the status quo and the alternatives proposed. Otherwise, nothing can be learned about 
their preferences. A description of the sample is also given. The fourth section contains the 
results. The starting point is a basic model that links respondents’ change in utility simply to 
the attributes of the proposed alternatives. In a second step, socio-economic influences enter 
the picture, providing evidence of marked heterogeneity of preferences not only between 
language regions but also age and income groups. The final section presents conclusions. 
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2. DCE AS A TOOL FOR PREFERENCE MEASUREMENT 
The method of choice for evaluating goods that are either public or not yet on the market is 
cost-benefit-analysis. Rather than relying on the human capital approach (which is not 
compatible with standard microeconomics (see e.g. Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, ch. 2), 
researchers increasingly determine the benefit part of the analysis using willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) estimates. Sometimes it is possible to infer these preferences from individual 
behaviour on the market. However, often recourse must be had to actually asking individuals 
about their WTP. 
In health economics, stated preference methods such as discrete-choice experiments (DCE) 
have been increasingly used to measure benefits and WTP. Applications of DCE to the 
valuation of healthcare programs have become numerous recently (see Ryan and Gerard, 2003 
for an overview; Hanley et al., 2003). There is also growing evidence showing DCE to be a 
reliable and valid preference elicitation technique (see e.g. Telser and Zweifel, 2006). In a 
DCE, individuals are given a choice between hypothetical commodities. From the choices 
respondents make between the goods differing in product attributes, researchers can derive the 
implicit trade-offs between these product attributes. This allows the computation of 
respondents' marginal utility for each product attribute. With the inclusion of a cost or price 
attribute, a money value can be calculated for each characteristic as well as for the entire good 
or program. 
The advantage of this approach over other stated preference methods such as e.g. the 
contingent-valuation method lies in its closeness to everyday decision-making. Instead of 
asking people more or less directly for their maximum WTP, they only have to choose 
between products differing in various attributes. This increased realism of DCE helps to avoid 
biases that occur in other stated preference methods (Ryan, 2004). Applications in health 
economics have been revolving around studies of WTP for therapies (Gyrd-Hansen and 
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Søgaard, 2001; Merino-Castellò, 2003; Ryan and Wordsworth, 2000; San Miguel et al., 2000; 
Telser and Zweifel, 2002) or specific hospital or physician services (Ryan and Hughes, 1997; 
Scott and Vick, 1999). DCE of the type presented here, i.e. dealing with the healthcare system 
as a whole, are rare, one exception being Gyrd-Hansen and Slothuus (2001). For a detailed 
explanation of discrete choice models and their application, see Louviere et al. (2000) or 
Train (2003). 
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
To elicit preferences of the Swiss residential population with regard to proposed changes in 
the healthcare system, a DCE was designed featuring hypothetical insurance contracts. Their 
attributes reflect the reforms that are debated at present by policy makers. These contract 
attributes were pre-selected in expert sessions with representatives of the Swiss health care 
system and their relevance checked in a pre-test. The nine characteristics retained are listed in 
Table 1. 
The possibilities considered are the following. Free choice of physician is restricted to a list of 
contract providers dressed up by the insurer (PHYSLIST). The list can be made up applying 
different selection criteria, viz. cost, quality, or efficiency, defined as the quality-cost ratio 
(PHYSCOST, PHYSQUAL, PHYSEFF). The number of hospitals available is reduced by 
closing small local hospitals in favour of larger centralized ones (HOSPITAL). Long-term 
care at present is only partially covered by mandatory health insurance in Switzerland. The 
proposed change comprises full coverage of long-term care, to be financed by those over 50 
years old (LTCARE), by a monthly premium charge amounting to CHF 50.  
With respect to pharmaceuticals, three types of restrictions in the benefit catalogue of 
mandatory health insurance were proposed. First, access to new therapies and drugs currently 
is granted immediately after their approval. The alternative is to impose a lag of two years 
(INNOVATION; as always in exchange for a lower premium). Insurers claim that such a lag 
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of two years (say) would generate substantial savings because the cost of innovative products 
goes down with experience in use. A hotly debated reform proposal is to reimburse only the 
generic (or lowest-priced) variant of a medication if available on the Swiss market 
(GENERICS). In a similar vein, the insurer could offer a policy that does not provide 
reimbursement for ‘comfort’ drugs designed to alleviate minor health complaints (MINOR). 
Finally, each alternative is characterized by an absolute change in the monthly insurance 
premium (PREMIUM). 
Table 1 Product attributes and levels in the status quo and the proposed alternatives 
Attribute Labels Levels 1)




- Status quo: free choice of physician in the home canton 
- Providers selected by health insurers on the basis of: cost, quality, cost-
quality (efficiency) 
Centralization of hospitals HOSPITAL - Status quo: existing hospitals 
- Closing of local hospitals 
Long-term care LTCARE - Status quo: long-term care only partially covered 
- Coverage of long-term care, financed by those aged over 50 
Premium PREMIUM - Reduction of the monthly premium by CHF 10, 25, 60 2)
Attributes dealing with pharmaceuticals 
Innovation  INNOVATION - Status quo: all treatment methods covered immediately following approval  
- Innovative therapies covered two years after approval  
Generics GENERICS - Status quo: all drugs on the official list reimbursed  
- Generic version (cheapest product on the market) reimbursed only 
Medication for minor illnesses MINOR - Status quo: All drugs on the official list reimbursed 
- Medications for minor diseases such as the common cold to be paid out-
of-pocket 
1) Coding for the dummy variables: status quo=0, alternative=1 
2) 1 CHF=0.45 £ at 2004 exchange rates 
 
In principle, this design results in 384 possible contract variants. Since this is an excessive 
number, statistical design theory (Kuhfeld et al., 1994; Hardin and Sloane, 1993) was applied 
to obtain a fractional design that permits estimation of main effects and two-way interaction 
effects. This resulted in 40 alternatives, which were randomly assigned to four split samples. 
Therefore, each participant had to make 10 choices. 
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The organization of Swiss health insurance favours conducting a choice experiment of this 
complexity, several elements of choice having been introduced in 1996. In the status quo of 
2003, the insured could already choose between different levels of annual deductibles (with 
CHF 230 (104£) being the minimum), and between conventional fee-for-service and Managed 
Care alternatives. In addition, they can change their insurer every year, basically without 
bearing transaction costs. Insurance premiums differ between competing insurers and regions 
but are otherwise uniform across sex and age groups. About 80 percent of consumers have 
some kind of supplementary private insurance, which, however, must not waive legally 
prescribed cost sharing (i.e. the CHF 230 deductible plus 10 percent copayment on HCE with 
a cap at CHF 700 annually). The Swiss are therefore familiar with choice options in their 
health insurance, which should make the experiment less hypothetical. 
The survey proceeded in two steps. In a first telephone contact, people were asked whether 
they would be willing to take part in the study. Those agreeing to participate received a 
package containing documentation materials to make sure that all respondents had the same 
information about the Swiss healthcare system and knew their current insurance premium. 
Additionally, each respondent received 11 decision cards for the actual DCE. One card 
described the status quo; the remaining 10 cards, the alternative contracts respondent had to 
opt for or against. The second step consisted in an appointed telephone interview during the 
Fall of 2003, involving 1,032 adult residents of Switzerland (except the Italian-speaking area 
of Ticino). 
4. RESULTS 
The estimated utility function was assumed to be the same linear one for all individuals and to 
have only the characteristics of the health insurance contract as described in Table 1 as its 
arguments. With the exception of the two attributes describing a restricted access to drugs 
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(GENERICS and MINOR), all coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected 
signs. 
Since the attributes amount to restrictions compared to the status quo, their monetary 
valuation is given by willingness-to-accept (WTA), or compensation demanded, rather than 
WTP. Therefore, the WTA values in Table 2 indicate the monetary amount of compensation 
that is necessary on average for respondents to accept an insurance contract with less 
comprehensive coverage. To put these estimates in perspective, note that the nationwide 
average premiums as of 2003 is CHF 270 (£121) per month. 
Accepting a physician list based on a cost criterion (PHYSCOST) requires the highest 
compensation of CHF 103, more than one-third of the average monthly premium. If insurers 
were to select participating physicians according to quality criteria only (PHYSQUAL), 
compensations required drop by some 50 percent on average to CHF 53. However, the drop in 
compensation asked is even more marked if the envisaged criteria for selecting physicians are 
both quality and cost, which amounts to an efficiency criterion (PHYSEFF). Compensation 
necessary to make the insured accept having their choice of hospital restricted (by closing 
inefficient small local units) attains values that come close to those of a physician list on 
efficiency criteria. 
 
Table 2 WTA for restrictions in insurance coverage, in CHF per month  
 WTA std.err. 1) z value 95% confidence interval 
PHYSCOST 103 13.16 7.85 77.49 129.06 
PHYSQUAL 53 8.85 6.03 35.98 70.67 
PHYSEFF 42 7.78 5.39  26.71 57.21 
HOSPITAL 37 5.67 6.58  26.18  48.42 
LTCARE 25 4.76 5.24  15.57  34.22 
INNOVATION 65 7.88 8.20 49.19 80.09 
GENERICS 3 5.49 0.49 -8.08 13.43 
MINOR -6 5.33 -1.21  -16.92 3.97 
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Turning to the restrictions on pharmaceuticals, table 2 shows that delaying access to new 
therapies and drugs by two years would have to be compensated very highly (by CHF 65), 
too. This makes sense because such a delay is a restriction that applies across the board, 
regardless of the type of therapy (pharmaceutical vs. medical) and the setting (ambulatory 
care vs. hospital care). By way of contrast, a drug benefit restricted to generics if available 
(GENERICS) is quite small on average (CHF 3) and does not even call for compensation 
within most subgroups in view of the large standard error of the estimates. There are two 
likely reasons for this. First, generic drug substitution has been enjoying an increasing degree 
of acceptance, and second, relatively few original drugs have admitted generic substitutes in 
Switzerland (their market share being less than 5 percent), which means that the 
corresponding restriction would not be binding very often. When it comes to do without 
reimbursement of drugs that help against minor complaints the (MINOR) Swiss population 
even seems to exhibit a small positive WTP for such a restriction. This can be interpreted as 
an instance of ‘warm glow’, i.e. the tendency of (at least some) respondents to choose 
alternatives they believe to be socially acclaimed (Andreoni, 1995). This ‘warm glow’ effect 
already disappears, however, with those more likely affected (currently undergoing 
treatment), who exhibit a positive average amount of compensation asked (see table 3). 
In table 3 the three restrictions concerning the drug benefits are listed again, this time 
horizontally (for results w.r.t. the other attributes, see Zweifel et al., 2006). Among all 
subgroups distinguished, a delay in access to therapeutic innovation would have to be 
compensated most, usually followed by mandatory generic substitution. Already here, 
however, there are subgroups who exhibit a positive WTP, such as those aged 65+ (CHF -24 
compensation asked; value not significantly different from zero, however with a standard 
error of 27.8). In that age group this restriction is even more accepted than paying comfort 
drugs out-of-pocket (CHF -19 compensation asked). 
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Table 3: Compensation asked for regulatory restrictions w.r.t pharmaceuticals, Switzerland 
Amounts in CHF / month 
Socioeconomic  
characteristics 
Access to new therapies 
and drugs delayed by 2 
years (INNOVATION)  
(1) 
Reimbursement of 
generics only  
(GENERICS) 
(2) 
No reimbursement of 
drugs for minor 
complaints (MINOR) 
(3) 
Total sample 65 (7.9) 3 (5.5) -6 (5.3) 
Gender 
Female 68 (13.3) 4 (9.2) -12 (9.1) 
Male 63 (9.9) 1 (6.8) -3 (6.7) 
Age 
25-39 45 (6.7) 9 (5.9) -2 (5.6) 
40-64 101 (24.5) -4 (11.9) -14 (11.9) 
65+ 83 (45.6) -24 (27.8) -19 (26.9) 
Region 
German-speaking 56 (7.1) 5 (5.5) -5 (5.3) 
French-speaking 117 (45.4) -14 (19.6) -13 (19.2) 
Average monthly income per household member 
< CHF 1500 52 (12.2) -5 (10.0) -2 (9.7) 
CHF 1500 to 4000 66 (10.3) 9 (7.2) -5 (6.8) 
CHF 4000+ 81 (29.4) -14 (17.5) -18 (17.8) 
Health status 
Healthy 60 (8.3) 0 (6.1) -11 (6.0) 
In treatment 82 (21.7) 10 (12.8) +21 (12.4) 
Hospital, last 12 months 118 (57.4) 28 (28.0) -24 (25.5) 
Note: 1 CHF equals 0.45 £ at 2004 exchange rates. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Reading table 3 vertically, one finds clear evidence of preference heterogeneity. Delayed 
access to new therapies and drugs (col. 1) would be resisted most strongly by the 40-64 year 
old who would have to be compensated by as much as CHF 101. Interestingly, it is not the 
age group 65+ that requires the highest compensation, a pattern observed also for the other 
restrictions considered. However, the biggest surprise is the fact that delayed access to 
innovation would have to be compensated by CHF 117 in the case of the French-speaking 
minority, the double of the CHF 56 required by the German-speaking majority. In relative 
terms, this cultural divide is even more marked in the case of accepting generics rather than 
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original drugs and of doing without reimbursement of drugs that help against minor 
complaints (col. 2 and 3). It may be worth noting that the two parts of the country have a 
shared history of 500 years and have been under a common constitution since 1848. Yet, 
preference heterogeneity apparently continues to be so marked as to seed serious doubts on 
the appropriateness of uniform regulation of health care on the federal level. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Regulation tends to burden both producers and consumers with efficiency losses. 
Nevertheless, it may be justified if it helps to avoid or reduce externalities. In the case of 
health care, observing market behaviour for inferring efficiency losses constitutes an 
imperfect guide for policy. The externality to be considered is moral hazard, which can be 
controlled by imposing restrictions on the choice of healthcare providers and therapies 
covered by insurance. When such restrictions are in the planning stage, behaviour under 
regulation cannot be observed. In this situation, the use of experiments simulating market 
behaviour can provide valuable guidance. 
The discrete-choice experiments (DCE) reported here have the advantage of realism. They are 
realistic because respondents had to decide between a fixed status quo and a series of 
alternatives that simultaneously change in all relevant product attributes. They are realistic 
also because under the pressure of competition, insurers who successfully control moral 
hazard (thus achieving a cost advantage) will have to offer lower premiums. In the case of 
Switzerland, this scenario is credible, since contracts already exist that offer a premium 
reduction in return for certain restrictions of the managed-care type (Lehmann and Zweifel, 
2004). It may be this realism that contributed to a very low rate of refusals in the experiment 
and clear evidence in favour of trade-offs between non-price and price attributes of the 
proposed alternatives. 
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The great majority of the regulatory restrictions considered do impart expected utility losses 
to respondents. Compensations required making respondents voluntarily accept them can be 
shown to importantly differ between groups. Indeed, immediate access to new therapies and 
drugs seem to command a very high value amounting to 25 percent of average premium in the 
total population and as much as 43 percent among the French-speaking minority, pointing to a 
great deal of preference heterogeneity. However, the other two restrictions on insurance 
coverage of pharmaceuticals (reimbursement of generics only and no reimbursement of drugs 
for minor illnesses) are valued similarly in the two language areas. The German-speaking as 
well as the French-speaking Swiss accept these two restrictions without demanding any 
compensation on average. 
The preferences are heterogeneous w.r.t. other socioeconomic characteristics as well. There 
are systematic differences in the compensations asked between age and income groups, 
between men and women, as well as between healthy and sick people. However, they may 
vary in both direction and magnitude according to the particular restriction considered. This 
constitutes evidence of considerable idiosyncrasies with regard to the provision of health care.  
This preference heterogeneity militates against the introduction of regulation imposing 
uniform pharmaceutical policies on health insurers and hence consumers. Rather, insurers 
need the freedom to develop policies that match the preferences of subsets of the population, 
to whom they are able to offer premium reductions corresponding to the amount of 
compensation asked for accepting the pertinent restrictions with regard to the provision of 
health care. 
Clearly, one size does not fit all for the Swiss population, and there is little reason for this to 
be any different with the British. Thus, imposing the ‘one size fits all’ rule leads to an 
inefficient allocation of resources also in a tax-financed health system such as the National 
Health Service (NHS). By giving citizens a choice between different health plans that may 
involve, e.g., different out-of-pocket payments, the government can make resource allocation 
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in the NHS better match citizens’ preferences, resulting in a welfare gain not only in the NHS 
but in the entire economy. 
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